BlackHat USA 2011, Day 2

The second day of BlackHat started out with a keynote by Mudge. I attended this one despite the normally-dull nature of BlackHat keynotes, because while Mudge is a Fed now (he works for DARPA), he has a long history as a contributor to hacker culture and I wanted to hear what he had to say. He introduced a DARPA program called Cyber Fast Track (it’s not government if it doesn’t have “cyber” in the name, after all) that allows small companies and even hackerspaces to receive grants to do infosec research, without having to jump through the hoops and fill out the forms for traditional government financing, all of which are designed for huge government contractors like Lockheed Martin and are nigh-impossible for individuals and startups. I appreciate the work he’s doing, and especially the fact that accepting these grants involves giving DARPA only government-use rights and not signing over the IP for the research.

Next I went to Chris Paget’s overview of the Final Security Review for Windows Vista. Since I’m someone who’s actually done Final Security Reviews for Microsoft and is part of the team that owns the Security Development Lifecycle, there was nothing here I didn’t know. However, Chris gave a very favorable review of Microsoft, and it was clear that she really appreciated the work Microsoft does in securing their products. For all the bad press Microsoft used to get in security, Microsoft has the most mature and complete security processes in the industry, and this is a remarkable turnaround when you look at where they were in 2001. It’s good to know that even on the much-maligned Vista they gave Chris and her team full access to everything and everyone remotely relevant, and got a very good return on investment in terms of security bugs fixed.

I missed the next session to pick up my DefCon badge. In my five years of attending DefCon, they have run out of badges every time, thanks to DT underestimating attendance (each DefCon has been much bigger than the last, recessions notwithstanding.) As a result, everyone queues up early to get one, making for hours-long lines. Though this year they went for a non-electronic badge, and thus at least had them on time, they did still run out by midday Saturday. Lines were about an hour at BlackHat, and apparently ran to over two at the Rio.

In the afternoon, I dropped into Moxie Marlinspike’s SSL and the Future of Authenticity. Moxie is worried about the constant compromises of SSL Certificate Authorities — many have had bugs in them that made it possible to get real, valid certificates issued to you for other people’s domains (e.g. google.com, or your bank), thus making it possible to eavesdrop on SSL communications in a man-in-the-middle scenario. One of the most-public breaches was the attack on Comodo that resulted in many false certificates being generated for some of the most important sites on the Web. But what happened to Comodo? Nothing! The CA system has no ability to change. Browsers trust Comodo, and even if we don’t like the idea of trusting them anymore — when they have been proven untrustworthy — there’s nothing to do about it. If browser vendors dropped Comodo, 20-25% of all secure sites on the Web would stop working. Moxie proposed a new system (he demonstrated it with a Firefox plugin called Convergence) wherein the user selects trustworthy parties, called notaries, which verify certificates for him. The notary system will prevent a man-in-the-middle attack just as well as the CA system does, and if you distrust a notary you can just switch to others, and nothing breaks. The user chooses who to trust. On one hand, this does give trust agility — the ability to change who you trust — which Moxie highly values, and it does prevent man-in-the-middle attacks unless the attacker is very close (from a network-topology standpoint) to the destination host (which is unusual — in most MitM attacks, the attacker is very close to the source host, not the destination.) On the other hand, I’m not quite convinced — the system does not prove authenticity, only that no MitM is present, so it doesn’t really substitute for the CAs. However, I’d say my friends and I spent more time discussing this talk than any other at BlackHat or DefCon, so right or wrong he got us thinking, which can only be good in the long run. The CA system really is broken, and it’s untenably fragile — if one CA has its private key widely distributed, everyone will be able to make fake SSL certificates forever. And there are thousands of CAs.

I went up to IOActive’s IOAsis suite at the top of the Forum Tower in lieu of the next BlackHat session. I’m not sure what actually happened between BlackHat and IOActive this year, but for the first time since I’ve attended the conference, IOActive had no official presence at the conference (whereas before they’ve been one of the top-tier sponsors) and ran their own parallel events at Caesars instead. I had a pass to IOActive’s events as well — spend five years in infosec in the Seattle industry and it’s hard not to know half of IOActive, particularly their CEO who seems to have the remarkable ability to remember everyone she meets, instantly and forever. I went to a talk they hosted about malware tools like Spy Eye and Zeus. Overall, they’re remarkable professionally-developed tools, with high-quality tutorials and documentation. They really make being a criminal easy, and if you happen to live in a non-extradition country like Russia, it turns out crime does pay.

Finally, I went to a talk about the latest Chip & PIN exploits. I have to admit, as an American, Chip & PIN exploits always seem kind of lame. They boil down to “with this amazing exploit, we can make European credit cards almost as insecure as American ones are all the time!” The fact that if you steal a credit card you can, you know, buy stuff with it until the cardholder notices it’s gone and calls the bank just doesn’t seem like a revelation. This said, it is interesting to see some of the dubious security decisions made in this “secure” payment system, and Chip & PIN will be coming to the U.S. in the near future. The worst threat here is not technical but legal — in most European countries, the fact that a transaction happened via Chip & PIN is considered prima facie proof that you authorized the transaction and are fully liable — either that, or you were negligent with your PIN and still fully liable. The fact that it’s possible to make these transactions without a PIN makes this dangerous.

At this point, BlackHat USA 2011 was over. I headed back up to IOActive’s IOAsis suite for their post-conference reception. I not only met up with several people from IOActive, but I also happened to strike up a conversation with someone who informed me that she was with the DC206 group — the local DefCon club here in Seattle that meets at The Black Lodge about 10 miles from here. We quickly found we had several friends in common, and she introduced me to the other DC206/Black Lodge people at the party. This worked out very well, as I ended up hanging out with them for the next three days of DefCon, and had a lot of great conversations with a very interesting mix of security pros, makers, and hackers as a result. Though I’ve been by the Black Lodge and DC206 events before, I plan to make an effort to be present for more of them in the future.

We went to the Microsoft party at the Haze nightclub in Aria, primarily because given the youth of the Aria property, none of us had ever seen it before. The party itself wasn’t bad — quite good compared to last year’s event — and they had a nerdcore rapper performing (I honestly don’t remember if it was DualCore or MC Frontalot, having encountered both of them multiple times during the week.) However, we stayed only briefly then moved to the Rio, where we hung out with other DefCon attendees at the pool. The Rio was kind enough to keep the pool open until 1am (much later than normal) for DefCon attendees, and even until 2am on subsequent nights, which was quite appreciated.

attacks, crypto, industry, risk, society

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